Charting and shaping the modern consumer. The rise of customer research in the Dutch department store De Bijenkorf by Furnée, W.J.H.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/180965
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-04-11 and may be subject to
change.
bmgn - Low Countries Historical Review | Volume 132-3 (2017) | pp. 37-69
Published by Royal Netherlands Historical Society | knhg
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
doi: 10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10398 | www.bmgn-lchr.nl | e-issn 2211-2898 | print issn 0165-0505
37
Charting and Shaping the Modern 
Consumer
The Rise of Customer Research in the Dutch Department Store  
De Bijenkorf, 1930-19601
jan hein furnée
In the decades before and after World War ii, major European department stores 
were increasingly eager to know and understand their customers. This article 
analyses how the Dutch department store De Bijenkorf, in dialogue with leading 
European partners, developed a wide range of research techniques to chart the 
social composition and buying behavior of its customers in order to enhance the 
company’s efficiency in procurement, advertising, spatial organization and sales. 
The customer research of De Bijenkorf helped to legitimize new business policies 
such as up- and downtrading and impulse buying, but also reflected and established 
new ideas and images of modern urban consumers as statistical categories behaving 
in astonishing regular ways.
De moderne consument in kaart gebracht. De opkomst van klantenonderzoek in warenhuis 
De Bijenkorf, 1930-1960
In de decennia rond de Tweede Wereldoorlog werden grote Europese warenhuizen 
steeds nieuwsgieriger naar hun klanten. Dit artikel onderzoekt hoe het warenhuis 
De Bijenkorf, in samenspraak met vooraanstaande Europese partners, allerlei 
nieuwe onderzoekstechnieken ontwikkelde om de sociale samenstelling en 
koopgedrag van hun klanten in kaart te brengen, teneinde efficiency in inkoop, 
reclame, ruimtelijke organisatie en verkoop te bevorderen. Het klantenonderzoek 
van De Bijenkorf droeg bij aan nieuw bedrijfsbeleid ten aanzien van bijvoorbeeld 
up- en downtrading en impulse buying. Het gaf echter ook uitdrukking en vorm aan 
nieuwe visies op stedelijke consumenten als statistische categorieën die zich op 
verbazingwekkend regelmatige manieren gedroegen.
the rise of consumer society
Introduction
‘Consumption is our common goal and pursuit!’ Dr. G. van der Wal, De 
Bijenkorf’s ceo, let himself go completely as he unfolded his vision on modern 
consumers in academic and business circles across the country during 1956 
and 1957.2 In his lecture ‘Buyology, or the art of buying’ he familiarized his 
audience with a new trend in the operation of large department stores: 
systematic research on the buying behavior of modern consumers, ranging 
from the analysis of cash registers, customer tracking studies, automatic 
counting systems to interviews, surveys, and photographic motion analysis. 
‘Buyology’, the economist Van der Wal explained, focused on charting the 
size, composition, timing, routing, and purchases of various customer groups, 
and aimed to enhance a store’s efficiency in procurement, advertising, spatial 
organization, and sales.
Systematic research on consumers was nothing new in the 1950s. 
As recent studies on the history of marketing and advertising have amply 
demonstrated, advertising agencies such as J. Walter Thompson, major 
industrial companies such as Unilever, and marketing consultants had 
already, well before World War ii, successfully developed a wide range of 
techniques to analyze the social composition of customers, their product 
preferences, and, increasingly, their subconscious concerns. Eagerly 
exchanging methods, categories, and ideas, experts from the us and various 
European countries not just learned to chart modern consumers, but 
also helped to shape them.3 Surprisingly, however, the historiography of 
marketing has until now almost exclusively focused on research by and for 
large industrial companies and advertising agencies and ignored similar 
research conducted by large department stores, indisputably major drivers 
of twentieth-century consumption patterns. We know that from the mid-
nineteenth century department stores organized their staff, procurement, 
1 I would like to thank the external reviewers for 
their thoughtful comments on the earlier version 
of this article, and Joost Jonker for his careful and 
generous editing work.
2 saa, Archive Koninklijke Bijenkorf Beheer n.v. 
[hereafter: kbb], inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de 
kunst van het kopen’. Lecture dr. G. van der 
Wal for the Amsterdam University Association, 
16 March 1956. Van der Wal presented the 
same lecture for instance at the International 
Advertisement Conference in Scheveningen. 
Algemeen Handelsblad, 12 September 1957. All 
source translations are mine.
3 R. Fitzgerald, ‘Marketing and distribution’, in: G. 
Jones and J. Zeitlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Business History (Oxford 2009) 396-419; H. 
Berghoff, P. Scranton and U. Spiekermann, ‘The 
Origins of Marketing and Market Research: 
Information, Institutions and Markets’, in: idem 
(eds.), The Rise of Marketing and Market Research 
(Basingstoke 2012) 1-26; S. Schwarzkopf and 
R. Gries (eds.), Ernest Dichter and Motivation 
Research. New Perspectives on the Making of 
Postwar Consumer Culture (Basingstoke 2010); V. 
de Grazia, Irresisible Empire. America’s Advance 
Through 20th-Century Europe (London 2005).
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and sales in a rationalized and increasingly systematic way, including the 
monitoring of sales data to feed procurement and advertising.4 Recent studies 
have also highlighted early initiatives of American department stores to 
exploit credit account books to understand buying behavior, leading to the 
development of ideas about targeted segment marketing during the 1930s.5 
However, the kind of customer studies which Van der Wal signalled has been 
curiously ignored.
If we want to better understand the rise of modern consumer society in 
the twentieth century and the making of the modern consumer in particular, 
we need to know more about customer research conducted by department 
stores.6 This topic also offers us the opportunity to link the historiography of 
marketing with the more established historiography of department stores, as 
well as with the older scholarship on scientific management and efficiency.7 
Starting in the 1930s and reaching surprising levels of sophistication in 
the first years after World War ii, customer research in department stores 
sprang from an international consensus that these enterprises, like industrial 
companies, should invest in systematic research to enhance business efficiency. 
However, systematic customer studies also sprouted from and contributed to 
a broader and equally international trend recently termed the ‘scientization 
of the social’: the rise of sociological and psychological concepts, categories, 
methods, and insights reaching out from consumption to politics, religion, 
and social care.8 What makes these customer research studies especially 
interesting from the perspective of cultural history is how they not just 
charted the composition and behavior of modern consumers, but also built 
4 M. Miller, Au bon marche. Bourgeois Culture and 
the Department Store, 1869-1920 (Princeton 1981); 
S. Porter Benson, Counter Cultures. Saleswomen, 
Managers, and Customers in American 
Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Champaign 
1987), especially 54-58 and 113-114; G. Reekie, 
Temptations. Sex, Selling and the Department Store 
(St Leonards 1993), chapter 3 ‘scientific selling’; 
B. Lancaster, The Department Store. A Social 
History (Leicester 1995) 116-118; G. Crossick and 
S. Jaumain (eds.), Cathedrals of Consumption. The 
European Department Store, 1850-1939 (Aldershot 
1999).
5 J. Lauer, ‘Making the Ledgers Talk. Customer 
Control and the Origins of Retail Data Mining’, in: 
Berghoff et al., (eds.), The Rise of Marketing, 153-
169. I. Jeacle, ‘Emporium of Glamour and Sanctum 
of Scientific Management. The Early Twentieth 
Century Department Store, Management Decision 
42 (2012) 1162-1177.
6 For a brilliant synthesis of the wide field of 
consumption history in general, including an 
extensive bibliography, see Frank Trentman, 
Empire of Things. How we became a World of 
Consumers from the Fifteenth Century to the 
Twenty-First (London 2016).
7 D. Nelson, Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise 
of Scientific Management (Madison 1980); 
Judith Merkle, Management and Ideology. The 
International Scientific Management Movement 
(Berkeley 1980).
8 K. Brückweh, R.F. Wetzell, D. Schumann et al., 
(eds.), Engeneering Society. The Role of the Human 
and Social Sciences in Modern Societies, 1880-1930 
(Basingstoke 2012).
the rise of consumer society

De Bijenkorf on Damrak, Amsterdam, circa 1950.
Amsterdam City Archives ( copyright ad Nieuwsmedia)
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upon images of modern consumers and impacted on those. Even though 
department store managers knew their customers much better from personal 
encounters, often daily ones, than advertisers, large industrial entrepreneurs 
or indeed politicians did, the new systematic studies still offered them 
increasingly complex and surprising insights in their customer base. How did 
managers respond to these studies? What impact did the studies have both on 
their business policies and on their images of the modern consumer at large?
De Bijenkorf’s customer studies offer an ideal case study to explore 
these issues in detail. Founded in 1870 as a small haberdashery shop in a 
major shopping street in Amsterdam, De Bijenkorf (the Beehive) evolved 
into the leading Dutch department store chain during the first half of the 
twentieth century, with monumental stores in Amsterdam (Damrak, 1914), 
The Hague (Grote Markt, 1926) and Rotterdam (Coolsingel, 1930). During 
the 1920s, notably the Amsterdam branch had increasingly targeted a 
well-to-do public, reaching an annual turnover of 10.6 million guilders in 
1930.9 More than rival Dutch department stores such as Vroom & Dreesmann 
or other major chain stores such as C&A and Gerzon10, De Bijenkorf actively 
committed itself to an international exchange of management expertise 
and scientific management in particular.11 It was the only Dutch member 
of the International Association of European Department Stores (see 
below), thereby profiting from an exclusive exchange of expertise, while 
from 1934 onwards the company’s managers and head buyers undertook 
regular study trips to foreign department stores, especially in the United 
States.12 The vast and scarcely studied business archive, deposited in the 
Amsterdam City Archive and counting 2,200 inventory numbers, includes 
9 For the history of De Bijenkorf see R. Miellet, 
Honderd jaar grootwinkelbedrijf in Nederland 
(Zwolle 1993) 98-125. Ileen Montijn, ’t Gonst. 125 
jaar De Bijenkorf (Amsterdam 1995). saa, kbb, inv.
no. 1141, Balansrekening 1930.
10 Miellet, Honderd jaar grootwinkelbedrijf. P. 
Hondelink, Vroom & Dreesmann: De opkomst 
en ondergang van het warenhuis (1887-2016) 
(Hilversum 2016).
11 Miellet, Honderd jaar grootwinkelbedrijf, 
106 mentions the introduction of scientific 
management in De Bijenkorf shortly. Despite a few 
exceptions, the historiography of Dutch retailing 
and consumer culture is still in its infancy. See 
the overview of literature in the introduction to 
this special issue. For the history of retailing in 
Amsterdam see C. Lesger, Het winkellandschap 
van Amsterdam. Stedelijke structuur en winkelbedrijf 
in de vroegmoderne en moderne tijd, 1550-2000 
(Hilversum 2013). For the history of twentieth-
century advertising and market research see: W. 
Schreurs, Geschiedenis van de reclame in Nederland 
(Den Haag 1989); Jaap van Ginneken, De uitvinding 
van het publiek. De opkomst van het markt- en 
opinieonderzoek in Nederland (Amsterdam 1993). 
For the dissemination of scientific management 
and the efficiency ideal in The Netherlands in 
general, see Cita Hartveld, Moderne zakelijkheid. 
Efficiency in wonen en werken in Nederland, 1918-
1940 (Amsterdam 1994).
12 saa, kbb, inv.no’s 336-358.
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a complete collection of customer research studies.13 Focusing on the 
Amsterdam branch of De Bijenkorf in particular from the 1930s to the late 
1950s14, this article will analyze from the sources how the management and 
the employees of the Research Bureau tried to understand and influence 
the shifting buying behavior of prewar and postwar consumers: which 
research methods they used, what their main focus and findings were, and 
how these impacted upon their policies and their general perception of the 
modern consumer. As we will see, De Bijenkorf initiated customer research 
based on sale registers in the prewar period, but exchanged this type of desk 
research for empirical observation inside the store in the postwar years, with 
a quickly expanding range of techniques and a systematic accumulation 
of research questions. In this process the researchers reconfigured modern 
consumers from an amorphous mass of individuals or intuitive and 
stereotyped social categories into statistical units, which appeared to behave 
in astonishing regular ways. During the 1950s the research results caught 
ceo Van der Wal by surprise and they fascinated him, but they also raised 
puzzlement and occasionally concern.
‘As soon as getting this chart…’ The initial customer research projects, 1932-1946
In recent years, the idea has increasingly surfaced that for the development of a 
company and for taking the right decisions about company policy it is valuable 
to examine the potential market (e.g. purchasing power, spending of income, 
buying habits, social composition of the population etc.).15
In 1930 De Bijenkorf joined the prestigious International Association of 
Department Stores (iads), a select club of prominent European department 
stores such as Harrods, Printemps, Tietz and L’Innovation. This branch 
organization, established in 1928 and modelled on the Retail Research 
13 saa, kbb, inv.no’s 1442-1477. For the great 
potential of this archive see also Anna Foulidis, 
Een stap voor. Hoe de Bijenkorf de Nederlandse 
consument (weer) leerde consumeren (ba-thesis 
University of Amsterdam, 2013), based on 
semi-annual corporate guidelines; Jeroen 
Melsen, Meer dan verkopen. Het aansturen van 
het verkooppersoneel in de Bijenkorf, 1930-1950 
(ba-thesis University of Amsterdam 2014), 
based on personel instructions; Marleen 
van Stokkum, ‘Amerikaans consumeren. De 
succesvolle Amerika-maand van de Bijenkorf, 
1955’, Geschiedenis Magazine 48 (2013) 27-30. Both 
theses and the article resulted from two courses 
on consumption history that I taught at the 
University of Amsterdam in 2013 and 2014. The 
customer research of De Bijenkorf was not part of 
the students’ research projects.
14 In 1959, De Bijenkorf took the first initiatives with 
store image and motivational research, opening 
a new era of research which is another story. saa, 
kbb, inv.no. 1472, Notitie inzake de voorbereiding 
van een motievenonderzoek (1959).
15 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam, hun woonplaats en inkomen’  
(1937) 1.
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Association set up in the us the year before, explicitly aimed to introduce 
the principles of scientific management, well developed in manufacturing, 
to department stores. With the fascinating figure of Hrant Pasdermadjian 
as its tireless secretary, the iads organized regular meetings, annual ‘critical 
store visits’, and policy memos to promote the exchange of knowledge about 
topics such as merchandising, store management, sales promotion, selling, 
accounting, and staff management.16 Following the iads’s requirement that 
members do dedicated research, De Bijenkorf established its own Research 
Bureau in 1932.17
During the 1930s the iads still considered systematic customer 
research as a low priority.18 Nevertheless, ‘repeated discussions’ had 
already signalled that modern market research techniques mostly served 
manufacturing industries rather than retailing.19 Members agreed that 
research on customers mix and behavior would likely become a major and 
perhaps even essential asset for department store policy. But how to go about 
it? In February 1932 the Amsterdam store of De Bijenkorf performed its first, 
somewhat elementary, customer count to support its analysis of turnover 
statistics, common practice for department stores everywhere since the 
mid-nineteenth century.20 On a cold Wednesday and on a bright Saturday 
employees posted at all four entrances tallied the number of incoming people 
per hour and counted a total of 37,251 men, women, and children.21 Three 
years later the Danish Magasin du Nord reported to the association about its 
surveys conducted on a selection of customers, while the London department 
store Harrods explained how it distilled information from the traditional 
monthly customer accounts.22 With the Dutch economy in a bad slump 
during the mid-1930s and turnover at the Amsterdam showing a serious 
16 H. Pasdermadjian, Management Research 
in Retailing. The International Association of 
Department Stores (London 1950); saa, kbb, inv.
no. 2694, D. Knee, The international association of 
department stores. An informal history (typescript 
1978); A Modern History of the iads, originally 
founded as the Management Research Group 
of Department Stores, is not yet available. The 
organization is discussed briefly as an example of 
Americanization in De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 
149. L. Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen. Le grand 
commerce français, 1925-1948 (Paris 1998) 211, 222, 
408-413 points to the important role of the iads 
in the organizational and mental preparation of 
European economic and political unification. See 
also: http://www.iads.org/ (8 August 2016).
17 saa, kbb, inv.no. 266, Algemene richtlijnen voor 
het organisatiebureau (1932).
18 saa, kbb, inv.no. 295-304, Reports on the 
meetings of 1929-1937.
19 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam’, 1.
20 Miller, Au bon marché, 66, 70.
21 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1444, ‘Staten van aantallen 
bezoekers in filiaal Amsterdam per uur op 6 en 10 
februari per ingang’ (1932).
22 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het  
filiaal Amsterdam’, 1. See also ibid.,  
inv.no. 301, ‘Verslag van de 21e meeting van de 
International Association of Department Stores, 
Parijs’ (1935).
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drop, De Bijenkorf’s Research Bureau seized upon these examples for its first 
extensive customer research study, presented in 1937.23
Its report ‘The Amsterdam branch customers, their residence and 
income’ focused on customers’ social class and their buying power so as to help 
managers decide the wider policy issue of which income groups ought to be De 
Bijenkorf’s prime target.24 Five researchers had analyzed three months’ worth 
of lists with parcels posted to customers and paid upon delivery, resulting in 
more than 100,000 transactions with information on the customer’s address, 
the article bought, and the price paid. Using the district classification of the 
municipal Bureau of Statistics and official information about the number of 
tax payers and average tax bills per neighborhood, the research team clustered 
the delivery addresses into eight districts and 37 neighborhoods, each labeled 
with a distinct class category.25 The study concluded that 57 percent of 
delivery turnover and an estimated 61 percent of total revenues was drawn 
from Amsterdam itself, of which more than half from the well-to-do southern 
area. The surrounding region counted for 32 and 29 percent respectively, of 
which more than two-thirds went to the Gooi and Haarlem, and the rest of 
the country for 11 and 10 percent.26 A complex calculation pointed out that 
people with annual incomes below 3,000 guilders, that is to say, 90.7 percent 
of Amsterdam taxpayers, accounted for only 6 percent of De Bijenkorf sales. 
By contrast, the middle income group of 3,000-6,500 guilders, 6.9 percent of 
taxpayers, yielded 67 percent of sales and the highest income group with more 
than 6,500 guilders, 2.4 percent of taxpayers, 27 percent.27
With this report, a first in the company’s history, De Bijenkorf 
managers gained a firm, systematic touchstone with which to test their 
personal, intuitive views of their customer base. Although the results broadly 
corresponded with their own experience and expectations, some of the 
outcomes encouraged them to reconsider company policy: but it remained 
unclear which direction to take. The report strongly suggested that the 
most affluent bought ‘only the cheaper things here’: in the top four tax 
neighborhoods average cash receipts were lower than in the four bottom ones, 
customers there bought proportionally fewer carpets, men’s fashion, frocks, 
girls’ and children’s clothing, baby items and table goods, and customers 
with the highest incomes contributed on average almost the same sum to 
23 J.L. van Zanden, The Economic History of the 
Netherlands in the 20th Century (London 1997) 
109-118 [nl versie 151-163]; Miellet, Honderd jaar 
grootwinkelbedrijf, 105-106. The yearly turnover 
of the Amsterdam branche decreased from 10.8 
million guilders in 1929 to 8 million in 1936, rising 
back to 9.7 million in 1940. saa, kbb, inv.no. 1141, 
Balansrekeningen 1930-1940.
24 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam’.
25 Ibid., 2-4.
26 Ibid., 4. Estimated total revenue was based on 
departments with more than 40 percent cod 
customers.
27 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam’, 12.
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company revenues as the middle income group. The authors fretted therefore 
that ‘apparently we do not stock items suited to more affluent customers or 
we fail to put enough spotlights on them; perhaps we do not meet the taste of 
this public’; so they thought it wise to align the product range more with the 
taste of what was called ‘the better public’ (‘het betere publiek’).28 However, 
the authors also considered the opposite strategy. Because 94 percent of 
all sales were generated by only 9 percent of taxpayers, De Bijenkorf might 
also try to radically broaden its customer base and make its product range 
suit the taste and purse of lower incomes. This could be a risky enterprise, 
though, given the ‘fear that then the more affluent customers, who have now 
so much more significance for us, would stay away’. Setting up a us-inspired 
‘bargain basement’ was presented as a lucrative alternative: this would easily 
expand the customer base and probably increase ‘the level of the main store 
somewhat’.29
De Bijenkorf did two more, smaller customer research projects in 1938 
and 1939, but the outbreak of World War ii prevented the company from 
applying their results to policy.30 The war had a tremendous, dreadful impact 
on De Bijenkorf. On 14 May 1940, the massive German bombing that ruined 
most of the city centre largely destroyed its Rotterdam branch. In October 
1940, the two Jewish managers Alfred Goudsmit and Frits Isaac were forced to 
resign following the German occupier’s aryanization policies and in February 
1941 the company was placed under German supervision or Verwaltung. Then, 
about 1,000 Jewish employees out of the approximately 3,000 employees 
in the three branches  were fired, of whom 767 did not return after the war; 
most of them had been killed.31 The Amsterdam branch continued operations 
throughout the war, even with strong financial results, but in the spring of 
1945 the store was close to being abandoned. The stock had almost entirely 
disappeared, many departments were reduced in size and lacked heating, any 
remaining products were sold on rationing vouchers. The book department 
alone still did good business.32
28 Ibid., 11.
29 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1446, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam’, 12. Goudsmit had explained this 
American concept in the iads after his study 
trip to the United States. saa, kbb, inv.no. 301, 
‘Verslag van de 21e meeting van de International 
Association of Department Stores, Parijs’ (1935).
30 In September 1939 the Research Bureau 
conducted a closer analysis of the average 
spending per tax class for all product types. 
saa, kbb, inv.no. 1449, ‘De klanten van het filiaal 
Amsterdam, hun woonplaats en inkomen, en 
de plaats van het filiaal in de detailmarkt ‘(1939). 
This research was preceded by ibid., inv.no. 
1448, ‘Staat van het aantal klanten per m per 
verkoopafdeling’ (1938).
31 Miellet, Honderd jaar grootwinkelbedrijf, 106-107; 
Montijn, ’t Gonst, 71-82.
32 Montijn, ’t Gonst, 78-80. In 1943 the Amsterdam 
branch had a record turnover of 11 million 
guilders, falling to 7.2 and 5.2 million guilders in 
1944 and 1945 respectively: saa, kbb, inv.no. 1141 
en 1142, Balansrekeningen 1940-1945.
the rise of consumer society

Graphic representation of the retail market of Amsterdam in 1936.
Amsterdam City Archives.
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Following the Liberation in May 1945, De Bijenkorf management, once 
again with Goudsmit and Isaac, immediately launched a range of initiatives 
drawing on the now valuable insights from the prewar studies. Early in 
1946, the Research Bureau presented a study entitled ‘On which public do we 
want to focus in the future?’33 It concluded that an answer had become both 
more difficult and more relevant than before the war, because De Bijenkorf’s 
market position had changed considerably. First, during the war and since 
‘a much lower public’ had been accustomed to buy in the store: ‘Although 
we don’t have any figures available, a single visit to the sales area is sufficient 
to ascertain this fact’. Second, the authors noted ‘considerable uncertainty’ 
about the different income groups’ purchasing power evolution. Although 
they expected that the ‘better situated’ customers would continue eating into 
their income during the coming five years, in the end their purchasing power 
would definitely decrease sharply. However, the closure or uncertain future 
of several formerly leading fashion stores, some of them Jewish ones, such as 
Hirsch, Maison de Vries, and Gerzon created opportunities to permanently win 
their well-to-do customers. The Research Bureau concluded that the future 
target public should be reconsidered fundamentally and asserted that ‘we 
should not rule out a radical change from our pre-war policy’.34
To support this fundamental discussion, the Research Bureau showed 
data from prewar research in a graph, another company first, admitting that 
‘initially the reader may have some trouble to work’ with this new way of 
presenting information (see p. 48). With two lines tracing levels of purchasing 
power and spending along various income groups, the graph offered a visual 
argument that both high and low income groups spent a remarkably high 
proportion of their disposable income on assorted articles present in De 
Bijenkorf’s product range, but actually bought from rival stores. ‘As soon as 
getting this chart’, the authors claimed, graphs like this would become very 
useful to assess the question of store target level.35
With its graphical representation of the room between disposable 
income and expenses, the chart showed more clearly than the pre-war 
reports’ numbers and tables how De Bijenkorf could profit from targeting 
higher income groups with a product range tailored to them. However, the 
authors acknowledged that lifting the range posed evident risks. Attracting 
affluent customers required heavy investment, raising the service level to 
that common in chique fashion houses like Hirsch, and accepting the cost and 
risk associated with the usually lower turnover rate of more expensive goods. 
The graph was also be used to present an opposite strategy, a radical turn 
to the lower income groups, which appeared even riskier. First, the authors 
33 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1452, ‘Tot welk publiek willen wij 
ons in de toekomst wenden?’ (March 1946) 1. Cf. 
the report Goudsmit wrote in New York in 1940 
on company policy following the Liberation: saa, 
kbb, inv.no. 251, ‘Rapport inzake de doelstellingen 
en richtlijnen voor De Bijenkorf voor 1940’.
34 Ibid., 1. See also 8-9.
35 Ibid., 2.
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reminded managers that it was ‘an open question whether the better-situated 
customers would still feel at home’, because they would probably ‘feel uneasy 
amongst the very mixed crowd in the store, in the presence of goods of a 
much lower level than they are used to buying’.36 A strong expansion of the 
customer base would also cause store capacity bottlenecks. Shoppers would 
probably not appreciate ordinary days becoming the ‘unpleasant bustle’ of 
‘pushing and punching, and squeezing up and down the staircases’ which 
they now suffered only during the peak Saint Nicholas season. De Bijenkorf’s 
professional buyers would have difficulty in meeting popular taste: after all, 
they were much more familiar with the needs of better-off customers to which 
they largely belonged themselves. In contrast to the prewar report, the report’s 
authors strongly opposed a bargain basement, though not because they 
feared deterring wealthy customers. Showing a curious sense of responsibility 
towards the spending and the taste of the lower income groups during 
the immediate postwar years, they argued that a bargain basement would 
stimulate more ‘speculating on the foolishness and bad instincts of the lower 
class than meeting the needs of this popular class [‘volksgroep’] in a solid 
and responsible way’.37 Summing up, the Research Bureau advised managers 
to continue targeting customers with prewar annual incomes of 3,000 to 
10,000 guilders as the department store’s ‘backbone’ and to put the limit not 
lower than the 2,500-3,000 guilders group: ‘We can firmly rule out the actual 
working population and even the group that follows immediately behind as 
our future customers.’38
The postwar research studies: customers as classes, sexes and generations
In the fifteen years following World War ii De Bijenkorf managers regularly 
adapted its company policy to the country’s extraordinary, fast-changing 
social and economic conditions. They closely watched government policies 
on rationing, wage restraint, social care such as child support, and taxes, 
tracked fluctuations in average income, thrift, and spending habits of various 
classes, observed what competing stores did, and weighed the impact of 
major, unexpected events such as the Korean War and the disastrous North Sea 
Flood of 1953. Every six months, managers drafted guidelines for all heads of 
department, issuing specific directives about purchasing, advertising, window 
displays, and serving customers.39 The immediate post-war period saw the 
company profiting from an ‘unlimited demand’ in what managers described 
36 Ibid., 6.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Ibid., 9.
39 saa, kbb, inv.nos. 248 en 249, ‘Richtlijnen voor 
de bedrijfspolitiek van de directie voor de chefs’ 
(1945-1960). Foulidis, Een stap voor, passim. For 
the socio-economic context in The Netherlands 
see Kees Schuyt and Ed Taverne, 1950 – Prosperity 
in Black and White. Dutch Culture in a European 
Perspective 4 (Basingstoke 2004) chapters 1 and 10.
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with the English term as a ‘seller’s market’, in which De Bijenkorf could sell 
all stock goods without advertising or even proper service. As early as 1948 
pent-up demand had been largely satisfied, however, forcing managers to 
develop new ways of catering to a new ‘buyer’s market’.40 Responding to the 
expected leveling of incomes, managers decided in 1951 to focus De Bijenkorf 
increasingly on ‘the more affluent groups in the civil service, administrative 
staff, and working class, which in terms of taste are attracted to the style of 
De Bijenkorf’, but ‘without losing the current clientele’.41 From 1954 a rapidly 
rising prosperity boosted turnover, stimulating the company to restyle itself 
as a Magasin de nouveautés, a deliberate policy of ‘uptrading’ with trendsetting 
products, avant-garde shop windows and special promotions like the 1955 
America Week.42
This constant adjustment raised the importance and profile of 
customer research. Between 1946 and 1958 the Research Bureau expanded 
from four to seven staff members and conducted six studies for the 
Amsterdam branch alone.43 Stimulated by the continuous exchange of 
best practices within the iads,44 researchers quickly developed ever more 
sophisticated methods and techniques to monitor the size, composition, and 
buying behavior of the customers – exchanging the prewar desk research for 
empirical observation inside the store and accumulating their new research 
questions, methods and findings in a self-conscious and systematic way.45 
During 1946/47, the Bureau for the first time did a customer tracking study 
(‘klantenachtervolgingsonderzoek’). On random days and at random hours 
over a period of nine months research assistants followed a total of 433 visitors 
through the store, noting their class, gender, age, accompanying persons, and 
40 Foulidis, Een stap voor, 13-17. In the us, the 
concepts seller’s and buyer’s market were already 
in use in the middle of the nineteenth century.
41 saa, kbb, inv.no. 248, ‘Richtlijnen’ (1951 ii) 1; 
Foulidis, Een stap voor, 31. Many British stores 
opted for a similar change: Jon Stobart, Spend, 
spend, spend. A History of Shopping (Stroud 2008) 
198-201.
42 Miellet, Honderd jaar grootwinkelbedrijf, 108-109; 
Montijn, ’t Gonst, 50-51, 137-138, 170-171; Foulidis, 
Een stap voor, 48-53. Stokkum, ‘Amerikaans 
consumeren’. Between 1946 and 1960 the 
Amsterdam branch’s annual turnover increased 
from 14.1 million guilders to 43.4 million. saa, kbb, 
inv.no. 1142-1144, Balansrekeningen 1946-1960.
43 saa, kbb, inv.no. 268, Organisatieschema’s van het 
concern, 1946-1959. In 1947 dr. F Menalda, later to 
become manager, acted as head of research, and 
in 1955 drs. L. van Kranendonk, also later manager.
44 This continuing exchange of information in the 
postwar years speaks most clearly from the 
extensive internal overview of iads documents. 
saa, kbb, inv.no. 305, Inhoudsopgave van 
documenten van de iads (1928-1969). For 
example: Market and Customer Research for 
Department Stores (dec. 1946); List of research 
jobs undertaken by the Research Department 
of members (1946, 1947, 1948); Market and 
Customer Research at the Innovation (1950); The 
Customer Opinion Investigation for Magazine du 
Nord by Gallup Institute (1950).
45 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1465, Overzicht van 
klantenonderzoeken 1932-1956.
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purchases.46 In 1948 a large follow-up study had staff track as many as 10,555 
buyers through the store and also interview them personally.47 Ten years later 
the Research Bureau expanded its methodological repertoire with its first 
extensive survey (‘enquête’) of 760 customers.48
Postwar customer research studies, like the prewar ones, primarily 
focused on the customer mix as categorized by social class and matching 
purchase behavior. Methodologically, this was not an easy task. Asking 
customers for their income level was considered not done, rendering it 
impossible to objectively determine a visitor’s social class. Research assistants 
mostly guessed customers’ social class using aspects of outward appearance, 
which remained unspecified but probably included an appreciation of 
clothing, physical care, and behavior. One of the first studies acknowledged 
that there were ‘no specific criteria’ and all assistants had ‘more or less 
divergent views […] on the question in which class one should classify a 
particular customer’.49 Asking customers for their residential address as 
a proxy for social class was considered as a solution, but rejected in the 
expectation that customers would object.50 Only in 1958 did researchers dare 
to add questions about home address and occupation, bluntly determining 
the social class of housewives from the occupation of their husband or 
father.51
The customer research studies provided De Bijenkorf managers with 
clearly categorized yet complex and shifting representations of the socio-
economic mix and buying behavior of its customers. In 1946 research 
confirmed the intuitive observation that a substantial proportion of visitors 
consisted of a ‘much lower public’ than before the war: no fewer than 
one third of the visitors were classified as belonging to the ‘popular class’ 
(‘volksklasse’).52 In 1958, however, the share of the ‘popular class’ appeared 
to have dropped considerably, because De Bijenkorf was again overwhelmingly 
visited by the ‘middle class’ (‘middenstand’) and the ‘wealthy’ (‘welgestelden’), 
a category also referred to as ‘the wealth’ (‘de welstand’).53 This was not the 
46 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek naar onze klanten en hun gedragingen 
in de zaak’ (November 1947).
47 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging van de kopers in onze verschillende 
afdelingen’ (April 1949).
48 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1468, Klantenenquête Bijenkorf 
(1958). For the remaining three reports see: 
saa, kbb, inv.no. 1455, ‘Nader onderzoek naar de 
welstandsklasse van de bezoekers van het filiaal 
Amsterdam’ (March 1948); Ibid., inv.no. 1457, 
‘Uitkomsten van het onderzoek naar het aantal 
bezoekers van het filiaal Amsterdam met behulp 
van de automatische telapparatuur’ (January 
1950); Ibid., inv.no. 1458, ‘Klantenachtervolgingen’ 
(May 1952). The introduction of automatic 
counting equipment will be subject of the  
next section.
49 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, 3.
50 Ibidem, 4.
51 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1468, ‘Klanten-enquete’, 1.
52 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 2.
53 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1468, ‘Klanten-enquete’, 3.
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Table 1. Social class of visitors and buyers of De Bijenkorf (Amsterdam branch), 1946-1958, in percentages. 
Sources: see note 46, 47 and 48.
Table 2. Occupational classes of visitors and buyers of De Bijenkorf (Amsterdam branch), 1958 (N = 760). 
Source: see note 51.
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whole story, however. Focusing on buyers rather than on visitors, an opposite 
trend emerged. In 1948, only 10 percent of the 10,555 buyers were classified 
as belonging to the ‘popular class’, while their share had risen to 18 percent in 
1952 before slightly dropping to 16 percent in 1958.54 In 1952 the Research 
Bureau also noted with some alarm that during the first two postwar years the 
‘customer level’ had risen back towards its pre-war level, but noted ‘a tendency 
to drop rather than increase’ since then.55
Additional research on visitors’ occupations (or their husband’s and 
father’s) complicated the picture further. Without much ado the Research 
Bureau equated the professional class of ‘administrative staff’ with the 
‘middle class’56, but the proportion of this occupational group in both visitors 
and buyers soon appeared to be substantial smaller than the proportion of the 
income class ‘middle class’ based on estimates. Similarly, the proportion of the 
occupational group ‘workers’ was much smaller than of the visitors classified 
as ‘popular class’. This striking discrepancy went unnoticed by the researchers 
themselves and probably stemmed from their decision to put most customers 
with occupations classified as ‘other employees’ in the income class of the 
‘popular class’, despite their having similar average incomes as the ‘middle 
class’. Researchers inferred from it that 38 percent of the visitors enjoyed an 
average income of less than 4,000 guilders and identified a similar friction: 
‘It is striking that less than 38 percent of the visitors as classified by their 
appearance belongs to the popular class, even though the boundary between 
the popular and middle class is usually set at a (family) income of about 4,000 
guilders’. Implicitly undermining their own method of categorization by 
external appearance, the researchers explained this friction by suggesting that 
De Bijenkorf attracted ‘many customers with their own (non-family) income 
below 4,000 guilders, who will undoubtedly be classified [‘getaxeerd’] in 
the middle’.57 For De Bijenkorf the significance of subjective status groups in 
Dutch postwar society were ultimately as important as their classification in 
‘objective’ class categories. In the case of class relations the scientization of the 
social reinforced rather than challenged traditional ways of representation 
and classification.
The income classifications of the Research Bureau were really status 
groups, but that did not prevent it from continuing to apply the problematic 
labels of ‘popular class’, ‘middle class’ and ‘wealthy’ and to investigate their 
buying behavior as based on perceived income more rigorously. In 1948, 
additional customer tracking studies empirically confirmed the personal 
experience of the sales staff that on Tuesdays De Bijenkorf attracted more 
‘wealthy’ customers than on average and on Wednesdays more customers 
from the ‘popular class’. On weekday mornings, the Research Bureau asserted, 
54 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen 
en ondervraging’, 3. Ibid., inv.no. 1458, 
‘Klantenachtervolgingen’, 3.
55 Ibid., inv.no. 1458, ‘Klantenachtervolgingen’, 3.
56 Ibid., 14.
57 Ibid., 13.
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‘the accent is slightly stronger on the better public [‘het betere publiek’] and in 
the afternoon on the popular class’. During lunchtime, however, ‘the popular 
class was represented considerably stronger’: particularly on Mondays the 
public was ‘very popular’ during lunchtime, yet on Tuesdays ‘very chic’.58
Researchers applied the same ‘income’ labels to explore preferences of 
various (status) groups for specific goods and departments. During 1946-1947, 
they found that the ‘popular class’ bought relatively more food and household 
supplies, while the ‘better situated’ spent relatively more on sports and leisure 
items and on gifts.59 An extensive customer research study in 1948 calculated 
for the first time the three categories’ relative share in the turnover of all 53 
departments, presenting another first, a bar chart to visualize the relation 
between variables. The chart showed at a glance that in all departments the 
‘middle class’ shaded gray produced most of the turnover. However, visually 
the ‘wealthy’ dominated. All 53 departments had been neatly arranged 
according to their share in sales, from blankets, gift items and trimmings up 
to white goods, bedding and biscuits. This ordering relegated the contribution 
of ‘popular classes’ to turnover – from 28 percent for white goods to 0 percent 
for blankets, shoes and chocolate – to an irregular fringe at the chart’s bottom, 
emphasizing their perceived and almost desired marginal importance.60
Next to investigating shopping and buying behavior along income or 
status lines, the postwar customer research increasingly focused on categories 
of gender and age. During 1946/1947 the first survey revealed that 79 percent 
of the visitors were women and 21 percent were men and in 1952 that gender 
ratio had changed only slightly to 76 and 24 percent respectively. These 
figures could hardly surprise: De Bijenkorf was clearly a women’s paradise. 
More interesting is that the researchers categorized 48 percent of visitors as 
‘women walking alone’ (‘alleenlopende vrouwen’), 12 percent as ‘men walking 
alone’, 14 percent as ‘couples’ and 28 percent as ‘other groups’, such as 
mothers with daughters, friends, and colleagues. On average, couples tended 
to visit the store mostly in the late afternoon and most often made a purchase 
compared to the others. Men walking alone had a preference for the morning, 
stayed somewhat shorter than women walking alone and purchased relatively 
the least. Yet even though they represented only 13.4 percent of all buyers, 
they accounted for 14.3 percent of all sales. ‘Apparently the man is generous 
in spending money’, the researchers concluded with a strikingly naturalizing 
singular form.61 Just as with the three income categories, the Research Bureau 
used a bar chart to visualize the proportions in which all 53 departments 
58 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1455, ‘Nader onderzoek naar de 
welstandsklasse’, 1-2.
59 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 5.
60 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, annex ii.
61 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 1. Ibid., 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, 2.
the rise of consumer society

Turnover percentages of the three income classes in the Amsterdam branch 
of De Bijenkorf, 1948.
Amsterdam City Archives.
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depended on male and female purchases and presented the management with 
explicit lessons for the store’s spatial layout:
A logical layout should conform as much as possible to the requirement that 
the departments which are important for men lay close to each other. Our 
entire third floor already meets this requirement to a certain extent. The second 
department is not bad in this regard. However, the men’s wear and smoking 
articles on the ground floor are more or less isolated islands in the middle of 
‘female’ departments. With the layout of the new store in Rotterdam we should 
make use of the facts that we have found.62
At first sight the age groups distribution offered few surprises. Almost all age 
groups visited the warehouse in more or less the same numbers, even though 
clear divisions existed between ‘juvenile’ departments such as photography, 
books, and corsets against relatively the ‘old’ departments for hats, hosiery, 
socks, and trimmings.63 However, in terms of their share in turnover the 
differences between age cohorts were much greater than expected on the 
basis of personal observation.64 In 1948, the 35-44 age cohort appeared to 
be responsible for no less than 47.5 percent of total sales, with an average 
customer aged 40 buying three times more than 28 year old customers and 
nine times more than those of 65 years. The researchers considered this as 
a result ‘one would hardly expect’, despite the large catch-up demand just 
after the war.65 Between 1946/1947 and 1958 customers’ age mix changed 
profoundly. While the proportion of young visitors up to 27-29 years dropped 
from 27 to 15 percent, that of visitors between 38-47 and 40 to 49 years rose 
from 25 to 36 percent.66 Given their greater purchasing power managers 
were probably pleased to receive those older visitors, but the trend also posed 
a risk: if young people found De Bijenkorf less attractive, they were likely to 
frequent it less later. Not surprisingly, managers decided in 1953 to target the 
so-called ‘mademoiselle’ and from 1959 embraced the target group of young 
baby boomers, who demographically and culturally began to put their stamp 
on society. Managers claimed it to be of paramount importance to carefully 
monitor ‘the style, the use, and the consumption habits of this group’ and to 
keep the product line in line with the ‘teen-appeal’.67
62 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, 2 and annex ii.
63 Ibid., 7-8. Measured by percentage of buyers 
under 28 years relative against percentages of 
buyers over 45 years.
64 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 1.
65 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, 8.
66 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 1; Ibid., inv.no. 1468, ‘Klanten-
enquete’, 2.
67 saa, kbb, inv.no. 248, ‘Richtlijnen’ (1960 i), 5 en 
7, cited in Foulidis, Een stap voor, 79-80. See also 
Montijn, ’t Gonst, 171.
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
Number of visitors per day in the weeks around Saint Nicholas: a comparison 
of 1950 and 1951.
Amsterdam City Archives.
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‘Rabbit trails’: the size, timing, and routing of customer flows
The first immediate postwar customer research studies offered De Bijenkorf 
primarily a clear, ‘objective’ picture of the social mix and the buying behavior 
of its customers. However, the exact size, timing, and routing of visitor 
flows remained an open, and increasingly intriguing, question. At the iads 
annual meetings member stores concluded that the dominant technique of 
counting door traffic showed a systematic error: on average incoming visitors 
counted outnumbered exiting people by 15 percent.68 To solve this problem 
De Bijenkorf installed a brand-new ‘automatic’ customer counting system in 
1949. All five revolving doors of the Amsterdam branch were provided with 
electronic contact points under the rubber mats connected to telephonic 
counters on the third floor. The automatic counting system monitored the 
number of incoming visitors for each hour of the day, how long they stayed 
on average, and how many visitors were present in the building at the same 
time. It could not distinguish between mothers with children or complete 
strangers sharing a single revolving compartment, though, and wear quickly 
caused disruptions.69 The new, absolute, results were nevertheless fascinating 
and were eagerly applied to optimize business operations. Yet they also raised 
some fundamental philosophical questions about the modern consumer’s free 
will.
Early in 1950 De Bijenkorf managers received the first data on the 
number, timing, and routing of all visitors to the Amsterdam branch. It 
turned out that the store on average attracted about 120,000 visitors per 
week and 20,000 per day. During clearance sales and the arrival of spring 
and autumn fashion, weekly numbers could reach 150,000 and during 
the Saint Nicholas season even up to 210,000. Tuesdays, Wednesdays and 
Saturdays were confirmed as the busiest days, attracting 11-20 percent more 
visitors than the average, which tallied with the number of transactions and 
turnover on those days. The daily pattern was equally revealing. After a quiet 
start between 9 and 10 the store had three peak periods: around half past 
twelve, around one o’clock and at half past four.70 A follow-up study, carried 
out during the Saint Nicholas season of 1951, offered the most intriguing 
results. With the aid of a graph, the Research Bureau showed that over two 
consecutive years the pattern of peaks and troughs in visitor numbers per day 
had been almost exactly the same. Moreover, exactly the same days appeared 
to have a high or low turnover per visitor, strongly correlated with almost 
identical patterns in the number of transactions per visitor and the peak of the 
68 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst van 
het kopen’, 4.
69 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1457, ‘Uitkomsten van het 
onderzoek naar het aantal bezoekers van 
het filiaal Amsterdam met behulp van de 
automatische telapparatuur’ (1950), annex.
70 Ibidem, 1-4.
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
Traffic in De Bijenkorf on normal days (1957).
Amsterdam City Archives.
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average amount of incoming cash. The Bureau qualified these results as very 
‘striking’ and ‘remarkable’ and was quick to expect other major sales events 
showing similar regulrities.71
When in early 1952 the various branch managers of De Bijenkorf 
discussed the latest results, they acknowledged that the Research Bureau had 
radically changed their view of customers: ‘It appears that customers in total 
behave with stunning regularity.’72 The added value of this new systematic 
information was evident. Firstly, the figures provided a business case to 
organize the deployment of the sales staff more efficiently, by adjusting 
lunch breaks to the traffic patterns of customers or by replacing some of the 
permanent staff by part-timers to be deployed only at peak times.73 Secondly, 
the results provided sound arguments for choosing the best evening for late 
openings: Thursday, when De Bijenkorf attracted the ‘better public’ and the 
average cash receipt was relatively high, or Friday, when the store attracted 
‘more massive visits’, including people on weekly pay who had just received 
their wages.74
Soon after installation in 1949 the automatic customer counting system 
in the Amsterdam branch had established that on average customers stayed 
for 27 minutes, substantially longer than the 18 minutes estimated just after 
the war.75 The majority of visitors (50.5 percent) entered the store through the 
revolving doors at the Vissersdam and left the store through one of two doors on 
Damrak (52.8 percent).76 In 1952, additional customer tracking studies revealed 
how many minutes visitors spent on average at individual floors, their preferred 
walking routes, and the intensity of visitors on of the floors at certain times.77 
All these findings fed into a discussion amongst managers about the relocation 
of departments with relatively high profit margins to busier floors, as well as the 
number, location, direction and even the speed of the escalators.78
However, the automatic customer count studies also raised more 
philosophical considerations. In 1956-1957, ceo Van der Wal, who by that 
time also served as president of the iads, proudly explained in his ‘Buyology’ 
lecture mentioned above how in the modern department store the traditional 
intuition of the entrepreneur had given way to science:
71 saa, kbb, inv. no. 1457, ‘Klantentellingen in het 
filiaal Amsterdam tijdens de St Nicolaasperiode’ 
(1951) 1 en 3.
72 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1457, ‘Notulen filiaaldirecteuren’, 
14 February 1952.
73 Ibid., saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst 
van het kopen’, 4.
74 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1457, ‘Notulen filiaaldirecteuren’, 
14 February 1952, 4.
75 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1477, ‘Het resultaat van een 
onderzoek’, 2. Ibid., inv.no. 1457, ‘Uitkomsten van 
het onderzoek’, 4.
76 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1457, ‘Uitkomsten van het 
onderzoek’, 1-2.
77 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1458, ‘Klantenachtervolgingen’, 
8-10.
78 saa, kbb, inv.no. 517, ‘Stukken betreffende het 
personenverkeer en het gebruik van roltrappen in 
de vestiging in Amsterdam’ (1957).
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The urbanized man appears to respond according to group 
 patterns. De Bijenkorf, ca. 1950
Amsterdam City Archives (copyright ad Nieuwsmedia)
th
e rise o
f cu
sto
m
er research
 in
 th
e d
u
tch
 d
epartm
en
t sto
re de bijenko
rf
61
furn
ée
In the three major cities we daily record 30,000 observations. This daily 
stadium full of people constitutes the object of the findings of our buyology. 
[…] By observing mass phenomena personal experience is worthless […]. 
We predominantly record exceptions, resulting in distorted and biased 
observations. Mass phenomena require special techniques to arrive at an 
understanding of actual events.79
According to Van der Wal, revenue statistics traditionally provided a clear 
assessment of the impact of seasons, holidays, and clearance sales on buying 
behavior, as well as of the effects of extraordinary events such as the Korean War 
or the recent Flood. Meanwhile customer observations had greatly enhanced 
the knowledge of the mix and behavior of the public. Yet only the automatic 
customer counting system – explicitly presented with the American concept 
‘gadget’ – had uncovered this remarkably regular ‘daily and weekly pattern of 
store visits, where every quarter, every hour and every day has its own place. 
Every quarter has its own number of visitors with its own average duration of 
stay. Even deviations from the normal pattern appear to behave according to 
established rules’.80 Van der Wal found this a fascinating outcome, yet at the 
same time he quite anxiously reflected on the modern consumer’s free will:
Is the undefined behavior predictable? This question can to a large extent 
be answered in the affirmative. The occurrence of an hourly, daily, monthly 
pattern and even a walking-pattern within the store speaks volumes. The latter 
phenomenon raises the comparison with rabbit trails. It seems there a free will of 
the individual does not exist; the urbanized man appears to respond according 
to group patterns.81
During the immediate postwar years, the finding that modern urban individuals 
appeared to have not much of a free will and, as consumers, largely followed 
group patterns fascinated people, but it also disturbed them, if only because 
they remembered all too vividly what collective peer pressure could lead to. Not 
surprisingly during those years, Dutch politicians, scientists, and novelists tried 
very hard to conceive a new, humanist concept of modern man, focusing on self-
insight and personal judgment. The ‘rabbit trails’ which Van der Wal detected 
in De Bijenkorf’s systematic customer research implicitly threw these efforts into 
doubt. In fact, modern consumers seemed to follow animal instincts.82
However, the ceo did not despair. ‘What is the business benefit of all 
this?’, he presented his audience: ‘The clockwork of the metropolitan civilization 
can only be predicted in its regularity, but it can also be accelerated or delayed 
79 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst van 
het kopen’, 2.
80 Ibid., 4.
81 Ibid., 5. My italics.
82 Ido Wijers, Terug naar het behouden huis. 
Romanschrijvers en wetenschappers in de jaren vijftig 
(Amsterdam 1991).
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by those who manipulate it with understanding’. It was the intellectually 
challenging task of modern department stores like De Bijenkorf to understand and 
to influence the consumer behavior in order to enhance the store’s efficiency.83
Catching the impulsive consumer
In 1952, the accumulation and combination of the customer studies 
conducted since the war revealed some striking shifts in the relation between 
the number of visitors, actual buyers, transactions, and average cash receipts. 
While the number of visitors had risen considerably since 1946-1947, the 
proportion of buyers against visitors had increased from 32 to 41 percent and 
the average number of transactions per visitor from 0.5 to 0.74. However, 
the average expenditure per visitor had hardly risen, from 3.27 guilders to 
3.41, while average cash receipts had markedly dropped, from 6.65 to 4.60 
guilders.84 This striking discrepancy could hardly come as a surprise and 
typically marked the transition from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market. 
During the first postwar years De Bijenkorf had profited from a huge pent-up 
demand from customers for long unavailable, often large purchases, and 
for products in large quantities. In 1950, the Korean War had stimulated 
a new wave of hamstering goods, but this demand had also been largely 
satisfied. Since the Dutch government continued its policy of restrictions 
on consumption, De Bijenkorf introduced cheaper products in order to 
broaden its customer base, with decreasing average cash receipts as a logical 
consequence.85 This trend caused an evident problem: the sales staff had to 
perform more transactions per person to maintain turnover level, prompting 
the Research Bureau into probing the customer mix and behavior for ways to 
monitor and, if possible, stimulate customers’ appetite for impulse buying.
To boost transaction numbers the Research Bureau proposed 
to reintroduce the prewar system of individual sales commissions and 
complimented this with a new type of research tracking sale process 
speed.86 In 1950 initial findings showed that on average customers waited 
1.07 minutes at a counter to be served. Subsequent phases from the sales pitch 
to getting the receipt for collection took another 1.08 minutes, followed by 
0.9 minutes waiting at the checkout and paying, and 1.1 minutes waiting for 
wrapping and finally receiving the purchased items.87 In 1956 the Research 
Bureau updated its research techniques by introducing a ‘photographic 
Robot’, which registered the speed of transactions at a number of sales 
locations and cash desks with even greater precision. Two years later a study 
83 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst van 
het kopen’, 5-6.
84 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1458, ‘Klantenachtervolgingen’, 1.
85 Ibid., 1-2.
86 Ibid., 2.
87 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1456, ‘Bepaling van de tijdsduur 
welke klant nodig heeft’.
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visit to the Parisian department store Printemps helped to further refine their 
time-motion analyses.88 This obvious Taylorism in full swing transformed the 
sales transaction from a personal exchange between seller and consumer to a 
closely monitored and managed product.
While striving to make the selling process more time-efficient, De 
Bijenkorf managers also attempted seducing visitors to increase their average 
spending per transaction, thereby leading the Research Bureau to make some 
unexpected discoveries. With an average of 120,000 visitors per week and 
a total of some 6.2 million visitors a year, the Amsterdam branch seemed to 
operate fairly successfully. However, customer questionnaires found as early 
as 1948 that as much as 65 percent of visitors lived in Amsterdam.89 Four 
years later interviews showed that 22 percent of visitors had visited the store 
less than three days ago and 56 percent less than a week ago. The Research 
Bureau used these findings to calculate that the Amsterdam branch had a base 
of 15,000 ‘solid buyers’ and a total of 30,000 ‘regular visitors’ on a population 
of more than 830,000 people.90 Showing as they did that De Bijenkorf not only 
failed to attract large numbers of inhabitants in its home town, let alone a 
wider regional or national public, these results came as a great surprise: once 
again systematic customer research clashed painfully with ideals and personal 
intuition. Managers nursed social and commercial ambitions for De Bijenkorf 
to occupy an exceptional position in the Dutch retailing landscape, so they 
found the conclusions ‘disappointing’: ‘We still conceive the department store 
as something more than just a reliable address for 30,000 patrons for more or 
less daily needs’. There was also a clear financial side: a wider, national public 
visiting De Bijenkorf for special purchases would substantially raise the average 
cash receipts.91
The need to raise receipts but also the ambition to perceive and 
promote De Bijenkorf as a unique department store in the Dutch and 
Amsterdam retail landscape inspired fresh research. In 1958 the Research 
Bureau concluded that quite a few customers, now referred to with the new, 
not too flattering English term ‘shoppers’, combined a visit to De Bijenkorf 
with other destinations such as the city’s leading shopping street Kalverstraat 
(30 percent), the cheaper Nieuwendijk (4 percent), or other department 
stores such as Vroom & Dreesmann, Gerzon, Hema, Galeries Modernes or C&A 
(14 percent). Even so 47 percent of the ‘total customer mass’ – another new 
term highlighting the increasing habit to perceive customers in statistical 
categories – visited De Bijenkorf only. They reached the store by bus or tram 
88 Ibidem. saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de 
kunst van het kopen’, 4. Ibidem, inv.no. 358, 
‘Verslag van een bezoek van De Vos en Visser aan 
de sectie tijdstudie van het researchbureau van 
Au Printemps in Parijs’ (1958).
89 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’.
90 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1458, ‘Klantenachtervolgingen’, 8.
91 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1457, Minutes branch managers, 
14 February 1952, 3.
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(37 percent), walking (27), car (14), rail (13) or bicycle (9).92 With an average 
of 270 cars during the quiet hours and 600 cars on busy moments parked 
simultaneously in the immediate neighborhood, De Bijenkorf did not yet really 
struggle with a parking problem. Yet car ownership rising and managers’ 
ambition to geographically expand the customer base beyond Amsterdam, 
plans for a parking garage along American lines were already under way.93
To increase the average cash receipts per transaction De Bijenkorf 
managers became increasingly interested in another strategy: stimulating 
what us marketing experts had only recently framed as ‘impulse buying’. 
In his 1956 lecture ‘Buyology’, manager Van der Wal implied that, at that 
moment in time, this concept was not yet widely known in Dutch academic 
and business circles, explaining to his audience:
There is a major discrepancy between the contents of the shopping list and 
the shopping bag. A significant proportion of spending consists of the so-
called ‘impulse purchases’ [‘impuls aankopen’] which happen ‘on the spur of 
the moment’, in contrast to the so-called ‘planned purchases’, preceded by 
consultation.94
Although the phenomenon of impulse buying had, of course, been known for 
centuries and shopkeepers had already encouraged these in all sorts of ways, 
measuring the quantitative significance for the total sales was a new challenge 
for systematic research.95 As early as 1948 the Research Bureau noted with 
great satisfaction that their studies ‘for the first time offer some insight into 
the importance of impulse purchases in relation to the purchases which the 
public had already planned to do’.96 The researchers concluded that about 15 
percent of total revenue could be credited to impulse purchases, noting that 
average cash receipts for impulse purchases was substantially lower than for 
planned purchases (3.30 guilders against 5.20). The ratio between impulse 
purchases and planned purchases strongly differed according to department: 
from 50 percent for handkerchiefs to a surprising low 5 percent for fabrics. As 
expected, the proportion of impulse purchases in total turnover was higher 
92 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1468, ‘Klanten-enquete’, 8 
(‘totale klantenmassa’).
93 Ibid., 6-7. Ibid., inv.no. 1387, ‘Rapport over de 
betekenis van het parkeervraagstuk voor de 
detailhandel in de Amsterdamse city door het 
researchbureau’ (1960). See in this context also 
Lesger, Het winkellandschap van Amsterdam, 335-
338. Tim Verlaan, De toekomst van de Nederlandse 
binnenstad 1960-1978 (PhD University of 
Amsterdam 2016), chapter 1 and 4.
94 Ibid., saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst 
van het kopen’, 3. Van der Wal used the English 
phrase ‘on the spur of the moment’.
95 One of the earliest marketing studies touching 
upon the subject of impulse buying was W. 
Applebaum, ‘Studying customer behavior in retail 
stores’, Journal of Marketing 16 (1951) 172-178, 178. 
Cfr. David Lewis, Impulse. Why we do what we do 
without knowing why we do it (New York 2013) 150.
96 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarnemingen en 
ondervraging’, 9-12.
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among affluent visitors than among the ‘middle class’ and ‘popular class’ 
(respectively 15.9, 15.7 and 12.5 percent), and also higher among visitors from 
outside Amsterdam than from Amsterdam residents (18.2 versus 14 percent), 
leading the researchers to generalize in the singular form ‘that the customer 
coming into town more easily succumbs to the temptation of the department 
store’. Falling back on the centuries-old trope that female consumers were 
more irrational and easier to seduce, the Research Bureau established that 
women did more impulse purchases than men (24.6 versus 20.6 percent of 
total purchases). However, the average cash receipt of men’s impulse purchases 
turned out to be higher than those of women. As a result, De Bijenkorf achieved 
a higher proportion of sales from male impulse purchases than from women: 
18 versus 15 percent.97 In his lecture ‘Buyology’ Van der Wal turned this 
surprising finding in a new general law about the modern consumer: ‘The 
woman lets herself being seduced more often yet for less than the man, who 
yields to his impulses less often yet for more’.98
Customer research once again proved its worth for determining where 
to place ‘impulse buying’ items in order to maximize revenue. Integrating 
data on percentages of impulse buying, corresponding revenues, and the 
average number of visitors to each department, the Research Bureau, for 
example, calculated that out of each 1,000 visitors the handiwork department 
generated 107 guilders from impulse buying, but the lace department only 8. 
In this way, managers received a research-based argument why the handicraft 
department merited a place on the crowded ground floor: ‘for the construction 
of our new branch in Rotterdam this example can be of great importance’.99
In the meantime, customers had still surprisingly little opportunities 
to touch the alluring products available, because nearly all goods were still 
stored behind counters in cupboards and drawers and shown only on request. 
Encouraged by recent American experiments with self-service (again indicated 
in English as ‘pre-selection’), the Research Bureau launched, in 1953, an 
observation study into customer behavior concerning products already 
available without sales staff assistance. In 88 percent of cases, customers 
appeared to pick out what they wanted independent of the sales staff and 
without showing any ‘helplessness’.100 Did modern consumers turn out to 
have a free will after all? In 1954, De Bijenkorf decided to radically change the 
arrangement of a large number of departments: the so-called ‘retail island’ 
was introduced, which was to significantly enhance impulse buying.101
97 Ibid., 12.
98 Ibid., saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst 
van het kopen’, 4.
99 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1453, ‘Waarneming en 
ondervraging’, 10-11 and annex 5.
100 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1509, ‘Onderzoek 
betreffende aard en omstandigheden van de 
verkoophandelingen ten einde meer inzicht te 
krijgen in het preselection vraagstuk’ (1953), 1, 
12-13. Foulidis, Een stap voor, 40-41.
101 saa, kbb, inv.no. 594, ‘Plattegronden en afdrukken 
van foto’s van de vernieuwde lay-out van enkele 
afdelingen’ (1954).
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Conclusion
In 1952 De Bijenkorf managers observed lifestyles becoming more ephemere 
(‘vervluchtiging van levensstijl’) in postwar Dutch society. The ongoing 
leveling of incomes seemed to break down the prewar class society and the 
recent independence of Indonesia and the Cold War heralded an uncertain 
future. Prewar virtues such as thrift, solidity, and sobriety, regarded as 
typical of the Dutch, as well as the living memory of the hardships of the 
war suddenly appeared to have lost their social and cultural significance: 
‘the uncertainty of existence encourages a lust for consumption’.102 For the 
leading department store in the Netherlands this transformation of postwar 
consumer culture offered attractive opportunities. But how to take full 
advantage of this phenomenon?
Building on research findings acquired before the war, a continuous 
exchange of expertise with European colleagues in the International 
Associations of Department Stores and a keen eye for developments in the 
United States, De Bijenkorf’s Research Bureau performed an ambitious series 
of customer research studies that monitored the size, mix, routing, timing, 
and purchases of the customers with a quickly increasing range of advanced 
methods and techniques and an increasing focus on correlations between a 
growing number of variables. Explicitly striving to apply the principles of 
scientific management to the department store, managers eagerly translated 
the wealth of findings and insights in specific business policies concerning the 
procurement, advertising, store layout, and sales techniques.
De Bijenkorf’s customer research not only informed and stimulated 
managers to attract a larger and broader range of visitors and to entice them 
to buy more products and follow their impulses. The studies also mirrored 
and promoted new images and perceptions of postwar consumers. The Research 
Bureau increasingly reduced customers to statistical categories, which, 
represented as abstract measurable units with average qualities, appeared to 
behave in strikingly predictable ways. Even though researchers realized that 
estimating social class on the basis of outward appearance was problematic 
and that a category as ‘popular class’ defined on either income or occupation 
did not necessarily correspond with each other, the artificially constructed 
research categories still regained a status of ‘objective’ and ‘real’ social groups 
in managerial policy. Without hesitation behavioral patterns of male or female 
visitors were translated into sweeping statements about the behavior of ‘the’ 
102 saa, kbb, inv.no. 250, ‘Overpeinzingen over de 
nota ‘Onze zakenpolitiek’ (1952) 1.

Interior of De Bijenkorf before and after the introduction of retail islands at De Bijenkorf (1954).
Amsterdam City Archives.
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man and ‘the’ woman. Statistical age cohorts were increasingly treated as 
generations with their own demands and identities. Terms such as ‘shoppers’ 
and ‘impulse buyers’ created new social categories whose identities were 
completely defined on the basis of their purchasing behavior, and, phrased 
in English terms, integrated into a global, Anglo-Saxon consumer culture. 
The surprising regularity customers demonstrated in their routes through 
the department store inspired manager Van der Wal to draw a comparison 
with ‘rabbit trails’, justifying researchers to represent the visitors as a ‘total 
customer mass’ whose instinctive, almost animal behavior was difficult to 
direct, yet which could be manipulated with sophisticated techniques.
Nevertheless, the new images, perceptions, and categories of postwar 
consumers which the Research Bureau constructed did not always result in 
an uncontested appropriation at the store’s managerial level. Manager Van 
der Wal’s public lecture cited at the start of this article clearly reflected the 
ambivalence of postwar elites about their role and responsibility towards the 
modernization of Dutch society. ‘Buyology’, he explained, ‘is an ambivalent 
sound of American origin.’ The phonetic association with biology confirmed 
his undeniable fascination to discover regular and even instinctive patterns of 
modern consumer behavior. Yet the apparent elimination of free will and the 
ability to manipulate customer behavior also raised serious doubts. At the end 
of his lecture, Van der Wal extensively reflected on Walt Riesman’s recently 
published critical essay The lonely crowd, which questioned the easy way in 
which ‘other directed’ people could be influenced by modern mass media and 
industry. ‘Under the influence of radio, film and television the last type is 
increasing in the Netherlands’, Van der Wal noted pessimistically: ‘Film and 
television call for identification and projection, expressing itself in the Audry 
[sic] Hepburn hairstyles of young girls. Staring at film and television threatens 
to degenerate our culture to a gaping cult [‘tuur cult’].’
Van der Wal was fascinated by the emergence of the ‘impulsive and 
often irrational consumer’ and stressed that ‘group behavior – not even 
consciously and with consultation – would play an increasingly important 
role in spending’. Frankly, he admitted that this would create attractive 
opportunities for advertising to influence modern consumers’ buying habits. 
But he also stressed the ‘great and growing responsibility’ of both industry 
and retail in this respect. ‘From the point of view of culture it is of cardinal 
importance’, he noted, ‘which direction this influencing will take’. Instead 
of appealing to the superficial, traditional taste of the general public, he 
called on industry and retailers – and De Bijenkorf in particular – to elevate 
the taste of the modern consumer with ‘effective and esthetic design’.103 
This was definitely not hollow talk to cover up commercial interests. In 
1954, an internal memo on De Bijenkorf’s ‘business morals’ explicitly stated 
103 saa, kbb, inv.no. 1463, ‘Buyology of de kunst van 
het kopen’, 1 and 5-6.
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that the company’s primary goal was not simply short-term profits, but 
‘properly’ [‘naar behoren’] distributing goods to the social ‘middle section’ 
[‘middenmoot’].104 The following year another memo further explained: 
‘We aim to direct and educate the taste of the general public, among others 
by a gradual increase of requirements in this respect.’105 Finding a balance 
between this patronizing yet idealistic mission and the often contradicting 
lessons resulting from the customer research projects: that would be the 
future challenge.
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